Abstract. This paper proposes a post-Kyoto scenario on commitment issues from a developing country perspective in which commitments by developing countries will be linked to human development goals as the first priority and ultimate goal, and then translated to carbon goals. Three different types of commitments are discussed with particular reference to developing country participation, including: voluntary, conditional and obligatory. For low-carbon development, there should be no luxurious emissions but human development needs should not be compromised. A progressive and internationally coordinated taxation on carbon is suggested as an incentive mechanism under this approach. However, there are a few issues requiring further examination, including specification of basic needs and determination of progressive tax rates.
Introduction
A variety of approaches of commitment to climate change mitigation have been documented in the literature (e.g. Baumert 2002; Hoehne et al. 2003; Pew 2003) targeting either emissions or policies and measures (PAMS). Emissions targets are specified in terms of carbon and set either in absolute (Kyoto type) or in relative (intensity) terms. Policies and measures are aimed at sustainable development including their impact on or implications for carbon emissions. Emission reduction is therefore a co-benefit (in some occasions it can be negative) of policies and measures for sustainable development.
GHG emissions arise from human economic activities but serve an ultimate purpose of human development. There should be no disagreement to a commitment that is made to human development. For human development, some emissions are essential such as those for basic needs while others such as luxurious and wasteful emissions are not only unnecessary but also in conflict with human development.
Emissions should not be used solely to power economic growth or to generate dollar value. Instead, emissions should be designated to human development. It is against the above background that an alternative approach to commitment is proposed focusing on human development.
Re-consideration of Emissions Target as a Goal
The target has to be set in a straightforward manner for stabilization of the atmospheric concentration level. But the experience since the Berlin Mandate has been rather confusing and frustrating. For climate change mitigation, it is necessary to limit emissions of greenhouse emissions, but GHG targets can be constrained by many other, even higher priority level, goals. There is an urgency to revisit the goals of Article 2 of the UNFCCC and in the meantime, a reconsideration of how to treat carbon target as a goal for global community.
KYOTO TARGETS: FROM BERLIN MANDATE TO MARRAKECH
With the UNFCCC entering into force in 1994, it was envisaged that a deep cut in GHG emissions would be agreed. A political will is well expressed in the Berlin Mandate. In March 1997, the European Council set a target of 15% reduction relative to 1990 emissions levels either individually or jointly by 2010 (EU 1997), a few months before the birth of the Kyoto Protocol. The analyses in the literature consider a wide spectrum, from zero to 50% cuts in emissions, including developing countries (Pan, Swart and von Leeuman 1999) .
However, the actual target in Kyoto Protocol is 5.2% reduction in aggregate by Annex I parties relevant to their 1990 levels, ranging from a 10% increase to an 8% decrease for different parties in Annex B. After the agreement of the Kyoto target in 1997, many of the Annex I parties have been able to excuse themselves from the implementation of the binding targets. First, some parties demanded the change of base year in favor of a larger reference level of emissions. This agreement led to a decrease of the target level from 5.2% to 3.6%. Second, further compromise is made to accommodate the request for inclusion of sinks. As a result, the level of GHG emissions is reduced further shrunk. The US refusal to honor its commitment in early 2001 and the Russian unwillingness to ratify the Protocol have now effectively prevented the Protocol from coming into force, despite the ratification by 117 parties. 
EMISSIONS TARGET AS A GOAL OF PRIORITY?
A few countries do not honor the commitment made in Kyoto and the developing countries demand that developed countries take the lead. This position is based on JIAHUA PAN clear reasons. Clearly GHG mitigation does not seem to be their first priority target in decision-making. For both developed and developing countries, the order of goals might be as follows: (1) First level: Political and/or social stability; (2) Second level: Economic growth or development; (3) Third level: Environmental pollution control and natural conservation. Climate change is only a subset of goals likely at fourth level and must be subject to the requirement of higher order goals. Even after a lower level goal is committed it may be disregarded simply because of its conflict with higher priority goals. This is one of the key reasons why the commitment should be made to human development rather than carbon emissions.
DUAL NATURE OF EMISSIONS
Carbon emissions have very distinct features from other conventional pollutants. For carbon emissions, there are three implications, each of which relates to a dualism. First, emission of carbon is both a commodity and a right. If it is linked to basic human needs, it falls into the category of human rights which should not be traded in the market (Pan, 2003) . However, if it is a commodity, it should be tradable. Therefore part of it is transferable and part of it is not. Second, emissions of carbon are not simply a good for household consumption like electricity and gasoline. More importantly it is also a commodity for collective consumption, for example, physical infrastructure like road and wastewater treatment systems. That is, emissions are used for both collective and household consumption. Third, emissions are both a public good and a public bad. As a public good, carbon emissions generate utility for individuals and society at large. As a public bad, they produces negative externalities such as global warming.
In summary, it is not surprising that Kyoto target does not work as agreed owing to quantitative limit of carbon emissions. Carbon should not be made a target in its own right. Rather it can only be an ancillary target and a secondary or even tertiary level target subject to fulfillment of higher-level goals.
Emissions for Human Development
Carbon emissions are associated with industrial processes and can be attributed to individual sectors. Like any other products or services, however, carbon eventually enters into the basket of consumers, individually (household consumption) or collectively (public goods and services). Emissions cannot be the goal of a government but serve the goals of political stability, economic development and environmental protection. Three types of emission can be identified: (1) emissions for basic needs satisfaction; (2) collective consumption and (3) luxurious/wasteful emissions. All these emissions are relevant to human development though themselves are not necessarily the goals.
FINAL CONSUMPTION OF CARBON EMISSIONS
For household consumption, two categories of goods and services can be distinguished: basic needs and luxuries. A decent living standard would require the consumption of necessary calories for survival, shelter, basic health care and education, and access to clean water and commercial energy. Luxurious consumption includes, for example, living space larger than necessary, large cars when smaller ones can accommodate travel purposes, excessive heating and cooling.
Infrastructure is a major category of public goods such as roads, railways, undergrounds, public utilities, airport, water supply and treatment facilities, flood control and drainage systems. All these require energy-intensive materials such as steel, cement and chemicals in addition to heavy machinery for their construction. Other examples include hospitals, schools and public buildings.
If we look at carbon demands associated with these final consumptions, we may note that carbon for basic needs (C basic ) is fixed at say, C basic , but that for luxurious consumption (C lux ) is unlimited; carbon for infrastructure (C infrast ) can be substantial but once it is constructed (C infrast ), its maintenance does not require much additional carbon. That is, total emissions in terms of final consumption (C total ) is:
Take nutrition as an example. Human requirement for daily intake of calories per capita is about 3200 k/d/c (Pan 2002b) . Lower than this may mean insufficient energy intake while higher may indicate excessive nutrition. Therefore an indicative figure for basic needs with respect to nutrition intake can be set at 3200 k/d/c. that is, C basic ¼ 3200 k/d/c. For luxurious or wasteful food consumption however, the level can be unlimited. That is, C lux ¼ µ. A party can make a commitment without any risk to emissions limitation at C total , specifically designated to C infrast and C basic for human development. These emissions can be then traced back to industrial sectors. C total can be treated as a right leading to a decent living standard but no ethical ground can be found to guarantee C lux as a necessary right to emissions. Therefore, no commitment should be designated to C lux . C infrast is for collective consumption, not only by individuals of the current generation, but also for future generations. Highways, railways, airports and many buildings can be used for generations. C basic is necessary for human survival and decent standard of living. Achievement of human development potential by the current generation is beneficial to future generations.
DEVELOPMENT WITH LOW EMISSIONS
The above discussion on types of emission can be useful for allocation and marketing of emissions credits. Emissions demand for basic needs can exceed available quantities of emissions of GHG prescribed for the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations. The proposition here is not to compromise fulfillment of human development goals. As a result, there is a need to seek low-emission paths to meet the same level of development goals. Figure 1 conceptualizes such a possibility. Suppose that human development goal is determined at a decent living standard without luxurious or wasteful emissions. As this goal is at a priority level and must be achieved, it does not consider the constraint by carbon emissions. For a developing country, conventional carbon-intensive technologies are likely to be used as there is a general lack of capital and technologies (CUT curve as shown in Figure 1 ). The emissions level can take a trajectory AA¢ to accommodate the need for infrastructure (Pan 2002b) , industrialization and urbanization (Pan 2002a) . However, the trajectory can be lowered to AB¢ if more energy-efficient technologies (BAT as shown in Figure 1 ) are made available and low/zero carbon energy possibilities are technically viable in developed countries. Therefore, low carbon emissions can be made possible without lowering human development goals. Low-carbon possibilities may include: (1) Structure of the economy: less carbon intensive; (2) Structure of energy mix: zero carbon energy; (3) Improvement of energy efficiency; (4) Use of carbon sinks; and (5) Social policies: e.g. family planning, poverty elimination 2 .
In Figure 1 , excessive emissions are to be discouraged so that emissions from the developed nations will be decreased. For many LDCs, their current level of emissions is at subsistence level, much lower than a decent living standard.
Commitments to Low Emissions for Human Development
Three types of commitment can be identified here: voluntary, conditional and obligatory. It is conceivable that voluntary commitments could become obligatory commitments if emissions reductions can be made with certainty. Conditional commitments can be granted to developing countries only under the condition that the obligation is restricted to emissions of greenhouse gases within the country that are defined as excessive/wasteful. A salient feature is that this commitment is made to human development rather than to carbon emissions per se.
VOLUNTARY COMMITMENTS
Two factors may contribute to autonomous reduction of emissions without any intentional intervention: technological progress and institutional innovation. For all energy users, there is in principle an internal incentive to increase energy efficiency to reduce costs. For countries at lower levels of technological development, spillover effects tend to speed up diffusion of technologies compared to countries that developed earlier. For instance during their industrialization process, currently developed nations experienced energy demand elasticities (percent change in energy use divided by percent change in GDP for a given period) were 1.0 or higher. But in the case of China, this figure has been only about 0.5 or so (i.e., energy consumption has grown at about half the rate of the economy) for the past three decades or so (Zhou et al. 2002) . This is primarily a natural or autonomous process, linked to technological improvements and restructuring of economic activities. Before climate change was recognized as a problem, such a trend had already existed. This trend will continue and may accelerate as the depletion of fossil fuels comes closer to reality.
Institutional factors are also important in reducing emissions. Increased awareness of climate change may lead consumers to voluntarily adjust their behavior towards more energy-and carbon-saving ways of life. For instance, in standby mode, a typical television set consumes 8 kW h per year more than it would if it could be completely switched off. There are billions of television sets in use in the world, and aggregate electricity savings of reducing standby power use could exceed 10 billion kW h per year. Institutional arrangements such as emissions standards and policy initiatives may also be designed to favor low emissions.
As this trend would continue autonomously, a party could make a voluntary commitment in accordance with the rate of autonomous energy-efficiency improvement. For this part of the commitment, no external support would be required and no strict obligation would be implied.
Energy-efficiency improvement can be measured in both monetary and physical terms, i.e., energy use per unit of economic or physical output. Therefore, voluntary commitments may be made with respect to intensity as measured by unit monetary or physical output. While physical terms are preferred, since monetary measurements are subject to fluctuation in market prices, for some sectors, especially services, this may be impractical.
For developed nations, this part of their commitment could also be made obligatory, since they lead developing technologies in energy-efficiency and low-carbon energy resources. It is easier for developed countries to measure changes in energy intensity per unit GDP because their economies are more stable.
CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS
Owing to technological inertia and lack of mitigative capability in the developing world, (Banuri et al. 2001) , an external push may help developing country parties to make extra emissions reductions without compromising their development goals. Conditional reductions would serve several purposes, i.e., they would: (1) make extra emissions reductions to contribute to stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations; (2) reduce the costs of emissions in developed countries; and (3) achieve development goals in developing countries. Thus, this is a 'three-wins' solution: emissions reductions for a better environment, lower cost for developed country parties to meet their commitments, and fulfillment of human development targets in developing countries.
The term 'conditional' has three special meanings here: (1) the extra reductions of emissions are conditional on the transfer of technologies or financial assistance by developed country parties to developing country parties; (2) emissions reductions will not compromise human development goals nor encourage luxurious or wasteful emissions in recipient countries; and (3) no credits of emissions reductions will be counted if no progress is made towards fulfillment of human development goals, so as to avoid the creation of 'hot air'. These conditions also imply that costs of emissions reductions in developing countries are lower than those in investing countries, otherwise there would be no incentives for such transfers of resources from one party to another. It is also essential that the reductions of emissions be made consistent with human development goals. Assessment of emissions reductions would be made with respect to development goals. Failure to make progress in human development would result in no crediting of conditional emissions reductions, even were technology transfers or financial assistance to lead to 'theoretical reductions'.
These conditions are similar to those employed in the Montreal Protocol for the replacement of ODS (ozone depletion substances). The phase-out of ODS in developing countries was made conditional upon technology transfers and financial assistance from developed nations. With such assistance, China successfully phased out most of the production and consumption of CFCs and halons.
OBLIGATORY COMMITMENTS
For human development and global environmental sustainability, satisfaction of basic needs is a basic human right and should not be compromised, but excessive consumption must be restricted. Therefore, the obligation here has two aspects:
(1) satisfaction of basic human needs and (2) restriction of excessive and wasteful emissions.
No distinction should be made between developed or developing countries in this regard. For all human beings and communities in both developed and developing countries, emissions for basic needs must be granted and excessive or wasteful emissions must be discouraged. It would be wrong to say that developed nations should restrict their emissions below the level of basic needs. It would also be incorrect to say that luxurious and wasteful emissions should be encouraged if the overall emissions level were low in a particular developing country. It might be the case that the handful of rich people in poor countries live a more 'luxurious' life than many of the rich persons in developed nations.
A practical problem arises in operationally defining 'luxurious' or 'wasteful' emissions. Despite greatly differing circumstances among nations and cultures, it would not be wise to use double or multiple standards to discriminate against any nation or culture. A simple criterion such as world-average consumption level or 120% of world-average consumption level might be used as a starting point. As nutritional and other essential requirements can be assessed and obtained from biological needs, figures such as those for nutrition, shelter and clothes can be employed.
It should be noted that this scheme does not entail eliminating luxurious or wasteful emissions. There are several reasons for tolerating luxurious emissions: (1) it is against human nature to forbid luxurious consumption; (2) as earning power varies widely among individuals, a small handful group of consumers or even ordinary consumers may be able or willing to enjoy some degree of luxury; and (3) the pursuit of luxury is an incentive to creativity and innovation and at the same time contributes to fiscal revenues for income redistribution.
Reporting and Implementation
Once the elements of commitments have been agreed upon, we need to make them operational. First, targets must be specified and amounts of emissions calculated as the basis for reporting. Then emission reductions must be verified before reductions are accepted. In addition, certain incentives need to be adopted for effective implementation of the commitments. These topics are treated in turn below.
QUANTIFICATION OF EMISSIONS TARGETS
Emissions targets must be linked to human development goals. One practical way is to assess and translate national development goals into energy demand and emissions requirements. In doing this, the following steps may be followed:
Step 1: Assess development goals. Many countries make comprehensive mediumand long-term development plans. Setting such goals is not limited to the practice of setting targets under planned economic systems. Medium-and long-term economic projections and forecasting are also made by academic or governmental agencies in countries with market economies. In China, for example, Five-year Plans have been made at national, sectoral and local levels. All plans should be country-specific and practically attainable. The intent is to assess (1) whether development goals are consistent with human needs, (2) whether there are wasteful or luxurious development projects such as five star hotels, golf courses and factories producing luxurious cars, and (3) how the goals are linked to strengthen human development. Commitment periods can be made consistent with duration of development planning (5 years is typical).
Step 2: Specify socio-economic and environmental targets. After assessment of development goals, socio-economic and environmental targets can be identified. These would include rates of economic growth, demographic features, welfare improvement, environmental protection, and so on. Such specifications may be made at different levels (national, sector, regional and local) for calculation of low-carbon targets.
Step 3: Identify low-carbon development paths taking into account availability of capital and technology. The above goals are high-priority targets and would be the basis for low-carbon paths. The calculation of quantitative targets will include the following components:
(1) Voluntary. A given country or industrial sector will plan or assume energyefficiency improvements for a specified commitment period, given the resources and technology at its disposal. For the whole world the rate of autonomous energyefficiency improvement has been over 1% annually, and the figure has been two to three times higher in developing countries due to technological spillover effects. This target can be set at either the national level or the sector/project level. Both developed and developing countries can make such commitments.
(2) Conditional. The technologies in use in a developing country are in general less energy-efficient than the advanced technologies used in developed nations. The difference in carbon saving can be made a target conditional on the provision of advanced technologies and financial assistance.
(3) Obligatory. Obligations must be made to avoid or restrict all wasteful and luxurious consumption and associated emissions. This would require rejection of some development projects and their emissions.
VERIFICATION OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
Commitments such as those stated above would be subject to international scrutiny, and compared to resource endowments such as technology, capital availability and energy supply. This would serve two purposes: (1) to factor out hot air, that is emissions related to unrealized human development; and (2) to provide information on the scope for lower emissions to achieve the same level of human development and thereby enabling the differences to be traded on international markets. The verification process could take the following steps:
(1) Ex ante information. The process must be transparent and information must be made available to the international community. As this is associated with development planning, required information would include the choice of development goals, the setting of socio-economic and environmental targets, and the specification of voluntary, conditional and obligatory commitments. In order to reduce transaction costs, no formal evaluation would be required and the final effects would be evaluated ex post.
(2) Ex post verification. Whether emissions reductions can be accepted and credits accrued to the host or investing country, the verification would be dependent on the final outcome. That is, at the end of each commitment period, a comprehensive review would be conducted to validate different types of emission reductions: voluntary, conditional, and/or obligatory reductions.
(3) Net reductions. The final acceptance would include only net reductions. All the luxurious or wasteful emissions would be excluded.
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
For implementation, both carrots and sticks are needed. In most cases, sticks do not work well in international agreements, as a party has a choice to withdraw from commitments. Therefore, incentives play a more important and crucial role in implementation of the commitments.
(1) Emissions trading. In principle, voluntary reductions are not eligible for trading as these should be considered as baseline activities and the result of no regrets policies. The conditional part is additional reduction and should be tradable. For the obligatory part, there is a need to look at the direction of change. If the reduction is achieved by restriction of luxurious emissions, credits should be awarded. However, if the reduction is relative to any increase in luxurious consumptions, there would be actual increase in emissions. The increase in emissions due to luxurious consumption should be deducted from reductions for trading. If the voluntary commitment is not honored, the conditional and obligatory reductions will have to deduct the voluntary part before credits enter the market. This would prevent the voluntary part of emission reductions from entering the market for trading.
(2) Conditionality requirement. Reductions should not compromise development goals that are associated with basic needs. If the development, socio-economic and environmental targets are lower than expected or planned, the emissions reductions should be reassessed in accordance with the goals of human development. This requirement is designed to guarantee that development goals take priority and to avoid overestimating emissions reductions.
(3) Progressive tax on emissions. A financial mechanism is essential to discourage excessive emissions. Similar to an income tax, a progressive tax on emissions is proposed here. The tax rate would rise as level of emissions rises. For emissions lower than basic needs level, exemptions may be granted, or a negative tax (that is, a subsidy) might be applied. If the emissions were at the basic needs level, a normal or basic rate could be employed. As emissions increase above this level, higher rates would be levied. For such a tax mechanism, the following purposes are kept in mind:
(1) reduction of luxurious emissions; (2) raising resources for low-carbon development; and (3) provision of a strong market signal to carbon emitters for efficient and effective carbon reductions. Given the existing international regime, it may not be easy to have it managed under an international government, but it is possible to have it harmonized across nations for implementation and redistribution.
(4) No exemption of luxurious emissions. The assessment of development goals and the use of progressive tax on emissions should be fully applicable whether a country is rich or poor. This is particularly true in developing countries where emissions per capita are low but wasteful or luxurious emissions are concealed.
Evaluation of Environmental Effectiveness
When human development goals are in conflict with emissions targets, environmental goals give way to higher-level goals. At least in the short run, emissions targets may not be realizable if such a situation exists. However, each case must be examined before a conclusion is drawn.
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY
As under this scheme commitments would not be made directly to carbon emissions reductions, there is reason for concern regarding environmental integrity. However, the goals of meeting basic human needs, such as those set in the Millennium Development Goals, are consistent with stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.
First, there exists an upper emissions limit (C total ) associated with basic human development if C lux is excluded. Excessive consumption or emissions are not in the interest of just the current generation but also of future generations. Second, as emissions in many developing countries may be much lower than this upper limit, immediate realization of human development potential may cause rapid and substantial increase in emissions (IPCC 2000) . However, development is a lengthy and gradual process. Some countries may grow faster than the others, while a few may actually decline not only in terms of the rate of economic growth but also in terms of the size of the economy (IEA 2003) . The spillover effect would speed up the process but emissions would also be much lower. Many industrialized countries have already reached the upper level and started to reduce emissions because of technological progress.
Third, wasteful and luxurious emissions will be discouraged although not eliminated. This would have two effects: (1) reduction of such emissions, and (2) promotion of low-carbon or decoupled development in developing countries for meeting basic needs, using resources obtained from taxes levied on wasteful and luxurious emissions.
Fourth, there may be several alternate paths to reaching the goals of human development. As concrete goals are established for human development, emission scenarios may be assessed and compared to select a low-instead of high-emissions path. As a result, actual emissions should be lower than committed levels of emissions.
For different countries, C infrast may lie between 0 and C infrast .
3 For many developed countries, development of infrastructure has already reached its upper limit. In such cases, there is no need to produce carbon-intensive materials such as steel and cement for bridges and roads except for repair and replacement. It is for this reason that in many EU countries the consumption of construction materials has been on the decline. No further emissions should be allocated to construction of new infrastructure. On the other hand, the infrastructure in many developing countries either does not exist or is under construction. Emissions should be allowed for these countries to expand the infrastructure essential for a decent life for their citizens. Similarly, differentiation can also be made regarding emissions for basic needs between developed and developing nations. Most importantly, emissions for basic needs and luxuries should be treated differently. Policies and measures should be directed to discourage wasteful and/or luxurious emissions. However, wasteful and luxurious emissions should be treated the same no matter whether these originate in a rich or a poor country. Low total emissions level from a poor country is not a reason to conceal or excuse wasteful and luxurious emissions from that same country.
UNCERTAINTIES
There exist many uncertainties around emissions in developing countries arising from the divergence between desired and actual achievement of human development. Voluntary targets may not be reached because development goals are set too high or due to political and social instability. Conditional targets may result in greater emissions reductions, but socio-economic and environmental targets may at the same time be compromised or lowered. Higher levels of commitments would not provide any scope for creation of 'hot air' as no sale of emissions rights would be permitted. As a result, this source of uncertainty regarding excessive emissions would be avoided.
COMPARISON WITH THE KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
There are a number of similarities as well as differences between Kyoto-type quantitative carbon-based targets and the human development-based commitment scheme described above. The principle is the same, i.e., common but differentiated responsibilities, and both represent commitments to reducing emissions either directly or indirectly.
However, some of the differences between the two approaches are fundamental. The basis of commitments under Kyoto is direct restriction of GHG emissions in terms of quotas allocated to Annex I parties. Under the human development approach, however, the basis of commitments is human development goals that take priority over environmental and GHG emissions targets. Human development goals are then translated into emissions implications, and lower-emissions approaches are assessed and commitments made to meeting human development goals through these alternate paths.
With respect to methodology, the Kyoto approach is basically top-down. The global community agrees on a global target and allocates quotas to particular parties. This way of thinking is still prevalent: Article 2 target of the Convention would suggest selection of a concentration level which is then translated into an emissions limit for allocation and commitment. Since national circumstances differ, there are many bottom-up elements incorporated in the Protocol's implementation to accommodate the concerns of individual parties. For instance, the base-year was permitted to be adjusted; targets for GHG reduction were not uniform across the parties; and flexibility mechanisms were introduced.
The human development approach, on the other hand, is driven by country-specific circumstances. As levels of human development vary widely, commitments are assessed and made in accordance with specific conditions, including growth of the economy, capital and technological availability, level of human development, etc. Thus, reductions of emissions under all types of commitment do not follow any topdown requirement, but rather depend on the potential at the project, sectoral, and economy-wide levels. The human development approach is also unique in separating emission associated with basic needs and luxurious/wasteful activities. Kyoto commitments do not explicitly discourage luxurious/wasteful emissions, nor do they acknowledge essential emissions for basic needs satisfaction, although developing countries are not required to take legally binding reduction targets. By contrast, the human development approach attempts to protect the rights to emissions for basic human needs. No restriction should be placed on development goals that are directed to enhance the welfare of the poor at large. Development goals are not compromised for reasons of emissions control. Luxurious/wasteful emissions do not stimulate welfare improvement and should therefore be discouraged if not totally eliminated.
Under Kyoto, incentives come from the sale and/or purchase of emissions credits. No matter whether one is rich or poor, the same price has to be paid for emissions.
Within a human development framework, a progressive tax system is implemented. The more one consumes, the more one pays. This not only discourages excessive emissions, but also supplies a fair and effective fund-raising mechanism for lowcarbon technologies. The Kyoto commitment is legally binding, while the human development-based commitment does allow flexibility for both voluntary and conditional reductions. In addition, a third type of commitment is also proposed under the human development approach in the form of moral commitment to restricting excessive emissions. In terms of environmental integrity, a Kyoto-type commitment can minimize uncertainty if commitments are honored. If parties withdraw from the agreement, environmental goals cannot be achieved. Human development goals are not directly linked to environmental targets and therefore environmental integrity can be problematic. As low-carbon development paths can generate considerable reductions, parties would maximize their efforts to reach their goals so as to acquire a better image. Their actual effects can be even better as no party would have an incentive withdraw from their commitments. So far, only developed country parties are required to participate in commitments to GHG reductions, and developing country parties are exempted from any quantitative limitations. The human development approach is primarily concerned with developing country participation, but developed nations can make their voluntary and conditional commitments legally binding. Therefore, there could be much wider participation under a low-carbon development approach than under a Kyoto-type commitment. As a base year has to be selected for proportional or relative reductions under the Kyoto scheme, hot air can be created if there is a recession or economic downturn, as in the case of Russia and Eastern Europe. Under the low-carbon development approach, goals are linked to human development. If no progress is made in human development, emissions credits may not be counted either in theory or in practice. All carbon reductions are assessed against planned goals of human development, preventing creation of hot air. Bottom-up approaches are based on self-assessment and self-interest, so there is an intrinsic drive to implement the development goals. In sum, the human development approach creates win-win solutions rather than the zero-sum games that become the focus of attention under a Kyoto-type target.
Finally, we look at flexibility/cost issues. Under Kyoto, three flexibility mechanisms are initiated for cost-effective implementation of GHG reductions. This can reduce costs of carbon reductions significantly if markets function well. But in many cases the carbon market is complicated by political processes in a manner similar to the oil market. As a result, the scope for cost-effectiveness reductions can be limited. Under the human development approach, by contrast, incentives are intrinsic to the voluntary and conditional commitments. Autonomous energy-efficiency improvement is a natural process and constitutes a 'no regrets' option. Without carbon policies, industries and enterprises together with consumers do their best to increase energy efficiency. The moral commitment is somewhat different, as many people tend to have intentionally or unintentionally luxurious or wasteful consumption behaviors. In this case, regulatory policies are necessary.
Discussion and Conclusions
Through comparison with Kyoto-type commitments, the major attractiveness of the human development approach is 'no regrets participation' by both parties and non parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as the basis of commitment is made to human development rather than to GHG emissions. In addition to this fundamental advantage, there are also a number of merits in practice, including full consideration of national circumstances, basic needs satisfaction, international cooperation, and incentive mechanisms for implementation.
On the other hand, there are a number of practical problems as well. The first is the difficulty of coming to a clear and widely acceptable definition and specification of basic needs satisfaction. Emissions for public goods and services can be relatively easy to clarify, including major types of infrastructures such as roads, railways, airports, flood control and drainage systems, water supply and wastewater treatment facilities, and urban metro networks. Once completed, there is no need for excessive construction of such a physical infrastructure.
Luxurious and wasteful emissions would not be eliminated, but setting the rate of progressive tax can be a political process. The use of the funds raised by such a tax system can be even more a difficult issue. In any case, so long as the principle is acceptable, actual figures can be worked out for operational purposes. These are productive areas for further investigation.
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